Maybe not the best timing for a launch of a device that's basically the Nano S + Bluetooth after the 25C3 presentation which showed what security issues the Nano S is facing. I doubt they had time to address those.
I'd prefer the "old" model with USB connection because it doesn't give much up in terms of usability but has a considerable upside for security. With Bluetooth all that's needed is a firmware exploit (which is a realistic assumption, we've been there) and an attacker only has to be within range of a few meters. He wont be able to steal the private keys but he'll be able to completely empty any wallets.
Note: the following paragraph might not be true anymore, see below comments.
Keep in mind: all the bluetooth, screen and button IO goes through an unsecure processor which then asks the secure chip to sign something. So exploiting the unsecure part pretty much defeats the whole thing.
This is great to hear. The website did not contain this information from what I could see. Just to clarify: does that mean that the screen and buttons are 100% controlled by the ST33 and do not go through the unsecure chip?
What happens when the battery is dead on this device? Why can't they make a simple USB C stick and focus an security instead of adding new potential entry points?
The FAQ says the battery can't be replaced. So you'll have a few years of life from it most likely. I totally agree that they should update the Nano S with the updated architecture for people who don't want the bluetooth attack vector.
I'd prefer the "old" model with USB connection because it doesn't give much up in terms of usability but has a considerable upside for security. With Bluetooth all that's needed is a firmware exploit (which is a realistic assumption, we've been there) and an attacker only has to be within range of a few meters. He wont be able to steal the private keys but he'll be able to completely empty any wallets.
Note: the following paragraph might not be true anymore, see below comments.
Keep in mind: all the bluetooth, screen and button IO goes through an unsecure processor which then asks the secure chip to sign something. So exploiting the unsecure part pretty much defeats the whole thing.