Many people don't trust Intel & the SGX technology.
Intel controls the initial attestation keys – so you're dependent on their goodwill. Much of the world will view Intel as being as cheerfully compliant with US government requests, including undisclosed & arguably-illegal requests. (That's just like how some in the US view Huawei as being compliant in undisclosed ways with the Chinese government's requests.)
Sophisticated, high-budget/state-supported attackers may be able to compromise SGX units, via physical analysis/disassembly/reassembly. (This might happen before a unit is placed in service, or just show up to the outside as a temporary service outage.) So any secrecy/security features provided by their qualities could be a false promise.
Some security experts deeply distrust both SGX specifically, and the general idea that such a piece of hardware could provide the touted benefits against sufficiently-sophisticated attackers.
Intel controls the initial attestation keys – so you're dependent on their goodwill. Much of the world will view Intel as being as cheerfully compliant with US government requests, including undisclosed & arguably-illegal requests. (That's just like how some in the US view Huawei as being compliant in undisclosed ways with the Chinese government's requests.)
Sophisticated, high-budget/state-supported attackers may be able to compromise SGX units, via physical analysis/disassembly/reassembly. (This might happen before a unit is placed in service, or just show up to the outside as a temporary service outage.) So any secrecy/security features provided by their qualities could be a false promise.
Numerous flaws have been discovered, and more are likely to be discovered, in SGX. Try: https://www.google.com/search?q=SGX+flaws
Some security experts deeply distrust both SGX specifically, and the general idea that such a piece of hardware could provide the touted benefits against sufficiently-sophisticated attackers.