"If something cannot go on forever, it will stop." (1)
Can this war go on for many years at current intensity? No. Can it be sustained past the end of 2023? Maybe, maybe not. Can it continue to "slow burn" - possibly.
1. Russia starts "testing" nukes and a deal is brokered that pisses off both Ukraine and Russia but allows them both to claim "victory", save face and not start a thermonuclear war (this is Henry Kissinger's take); or
2. US loses its taste of financing and completely backing the Ukrainian war if a big recession hits here (hard to support Ukraine when we start "really" feeling a economic hit at home and politicians are on TV everyday talking about how much is being sent to Ukraine); or
3. Putin has a health/life issue and a Western-friendly replacement is installed in Russia (Putin is no Spring chicken!)
All good, but I would add a more likely senario: A stalemate where Ukraine efectivly regains almost all of its territory, Russia is unable to sustain a meaningful campaign, but Russia continiues limited attacks with missiles and some artilery pokes near the border to avoid lossing face.
...a Western-friendly replacement is installed in Russia...
Some have forgotten that Putin was originally declared "a Western-friendly replacement". The world would have been a more peaceful place if we hadn't interfered in Russian politics to support Yeltsin and his chosen successor. Russia isn't the only nation in which our choice (??) of leader has led to "blowback", both for the victim nation and for most Americans. We should stop doing this.
Yeltsin was quite different from the successor in question. He "gave up" his "family" ruling in exchange for security guarantees.
USA probably should've chosen a stronger leader to support, but there wasn't much choice at that time. Or at least they should've helped to organize the transition of power to someone with a more credible past than that of a KGB officer.
> Russia starts "testing" nukes and a deal is brokered that pisses off both Ukraine and Russia but allows them both to claim "victory", save face and not start a thermonuclear war (this is Henry Kissinger's take); or
That seems like a bad precedent - nuclear blackmail and aggression works, you get rewarded with territory/concessions.
It is certainly a possibility, but in a way loss of credibility for US/West.
> US loses its taste of financing and completely backing the Ukrainian war if a big recession hits here (hard to support Ukraine when we start "really" feeling a economic hit at home and politicians are on TV everyday talking about how much is being sent to Ukraine); or
I think the monetary help might decrease, but the military help rather not. Sending old weapon stocks don't really produce any economic hit.
> Putin has a health/life issue and a Western-friendly replacement is installed in Russia (Putin is no Spring chicken!)
This is very unlikely to happen. Putin might be replaced one way or another, but the replacement won't be particularly friendly to the West. They might be slightly less (or more) antagonistic.
>... - nuclear blackmail and aggression works, you get rewarded with territory/concessions.
I don't think the concession would be territory, more likely a treaty to block NATO membership for Ukraine (say no Ukraine NATO membership for 20 years, or something like that). Possibly also deny access to join the EU (even though that idea has heavy steam right now).
If Russia "loses" Crimea, then it's an undeniable Russian fiasco and Putin has no way to claim the war as a success.
It sounds like a weird scenario where Russia threatens to use nukes and then leaves satisfied with no NATO membership. (worth reminding that this war wasn't about NATO at all)
I think Crimea is gone to Russia for good. It is out of play. I am talking about the Northern regions of Ukraine. In fact, I think the whole invasion of the northern regions was to eventually play that into a DMZ. Which it might still end up becoming.
>It sounds like a weird scenario where Russia threatens to use nukes and then leaves satisfied with no NATO membership. (worth reminding that this war wasn't about NATO at all)
I mean, Putin claims is was. So from his perspective, he can call that a win, right? If you take him at his word (I know!) then all he wanted was to not have NATO military bases on Russian borders. From that perspective, everything he has done so far can make a sort of sense, including nuclear threats. So, again, from that perspective, if he gets what he is publicly asking for, why would he not tout it as a win?
The problem is that Putin would probably require recognition of Crimea as Russian, which would essentially underwrite his conquest and create a precedent for further conquests/annexations of further regions with Russian majorities/minorities.
> I am talking about the Northern regions of Ukraine.
Russia pulled out of northern regions back in March and now occupies the east and south. TBH I'm not sure how seriously I should take your opinion in light of such a basic mistake.
> So, again, from that perspective, if he gets what he is publicly asking for, why would he not tout it as a win?
He might get what he's publicly asking for, but he's not getting what he actually wants. If he's willing to credibly threaten nuke use, I'd rather expect he will insist on having what he in fact wants (some sort of further slicing up of Ukraine).
>Russia pulled out of northern regions back in March and now occupies the east and south. TBH I'm not sure how seriously I should take your opinion in light of such a basic mistake.
Then let me restate it, any land touching or close to Russia. I think that is what he wants. A DMZ type areas on Russian borders and no NATO bases anywhere close to Russia (ie. nowhere in Ukraine). I think you and I are talking past each other with using North and East. Really, NorthEast would be more appropriate for the areas I am talking about and of course the South.
>He might get what he's publicly asking for, but he's not getting what he actually wants. If he's willing to credibly threaten nuke use, I'd rather expect he will insist on having what he in fact wants (some sort of further slicing up of Ukraine).
Well, he's not going to get that I think. But he can likely negotiate parts of Ukraine into DMZ type areas that are effectively controlled/not-controlled by both Russia and Ukraine. Like maybe technically part of Ukraine, but needs Russian approval for certain things.
I believe this is the most he can get, and eventually if he is willing Ukraine will be forced to accept it.
So, my bet, a buffer on the borders and some sunsetted period where Ukraine cannot joing NATO (and possible EU).
Apart from (1), the rest of your scenarios are unlikely.
Assuming (1) does not happen, there is likely little chance of the West seriously dropping its support for Ukraine. Maybe popular opinion of citizens will increasingly turn against the support, but the governments know very well what kind of message not supporting Ukraine sends to Russia.
And, Putin may well have a health/life issue, but if power passes to another person, it is likely to be someone even more hawkish than Putin. If you follow Russian opinion it seems Putin is seen as rather soft.
For #2, imagine how fast a new Trump presidency (unlikely, I think, but you take my point) would stop shipments to Ukraine. Also a very large economic impact here (say something twice the size of 2008) might have our government at least focused on something else rather than having to explain why a bunch of citizens are homeless and hungry but we are sending billions to Ukraine every month. It is one thing to support a war across the world when it is "just money" and everyone here is mostly fat and happy. It is altogether something else when you have to start worrying about your own family at home.
As for #3 a new person taking power can bend to local sentiment to keep up pressure but without the full commitment that Putin is making in Ukraine. This could play well locally (I suspect not a lot of Russians are happy to die for Ukraine) and be more "Western friendly" than a full-on war.
3a Although any "Putin replacement" could end the current Russian folly in Ukraine, if only to put a "under new management, I don't own the last guy's mistakes" stamp on their rule; but a viable replacement Russian leader is quite unlikely to be "Western-Friendly" in general. And there would then be Trouble at some point in the future.
re #3, aren't the senior Kremlin figures just as pro-war/Z as Putin (or even more so)? This would suggest that unless politics in Russia is completely upended in the event of Putin dying or being incapacitated, the war would likely continue or escalate :-/
Well, a new body can still talk all the same old shit, but give in to a (probably) popular (in Russia) sentiment to chill out. I don't know what the propaganda would be to say that they both won and also don't have parts of Ukraine.
Well let's hope so. I can't honestly say that I know all the intricate details (note how I said "senior Kremlin figures" because other than Medvedev, Prigozhin and Shoigu I don't know everyone involved) but I am a little pessimistic that a sudden change in President would make things better.
Better possibly in the sense that they withdraw, don't force as many Russians to die in actual combat, and mostly use missiles and border skirmishes for propaganda purposes. This could easily be pitched up as "keeping up the fight" but ease the pressure on Russian citizens ... so a sort of win?
