An interesting brick and mortar example in the Bay Area was Fry's electronics. When they started, they grossly undercut all of the electronics brick and mortar stores and priced more like the distributors did rather than the stores.
As a result their business grew quickly and the other stores were unable to compete and went out of business. Then with the market to themselves they raised their prices to increase their margins. They also used access to adjacent markets (TVs, PCs, Radios, Appliances, Office Supplies) to supplement their margin which specialty retailers like Quement or Jade did not.
Their strategy was essentially to lose money on something that brought in customers, and to make extra money on other things once the customer had been acquired and was in the store.
The "grow fast at any cost" mentality is predicated on the understanding that the most difficult step of any new business is to change consumer behavior such that they go to the new business first. Once they have established that pattern they can then manipulate the pricing of their offerings in order to achieve the highest sustainable level of margin before they lose customers.
Agreed, but phrasing it in the “here’s what changed that most people don’t understand” language that VCs love:
“in the age of cheap money, scale is not a defensive moat”
When Fry’s was founded, it was so prohibitively difficult to get the funding to scale to their size, that competition was thwarted by lack of investment. Now? The trick is public knowledge; the funds are cheaply available to anyone able to scale a competitor. So the critical step two —- raise prices —- is impossible. Your margin is my opportunity, as they say.
What worked in 1985 when interest rates were ~8% doesn’t work when the great global pool of money is sloshing around, desperately seeking returns.
I think the actual investment dynamics are more nuanced (i.e. investors aren’t completely naive), but it’s still true that this get-a-monopoly-and-raise-prices approach is a business strategy from a very different era.
The trick still works (and is quite common), because investors apply that reasoning to the upstart, not the established business. If you go to a bunch of VCs and pitch them "Comcast is making a ton of money because they own a monopoly and steadily raise prices. Their margin is our opportunity. Give us $20B so we can build out a national 1G fiber network and take all their customers", their response will be "What's to stop Comcast from dropping their prices and increasing their bandwidth once you've spent all this money building your competing market?"
Knowing that you're the attacker and they're the defender and that most consumer markets favor the incumbent, the investor won't hand over their capital unless you can show that you've already started to take their market. And then once you have shown that you're taking a fat incumbent's market, they're happy to fork over tons because they know that every other investor's reasoning will be the same, and nobody will want to attack an incumbent that can just drop prices to fend off a challenger.
BTW, Google decided to buck the outside investors in exactly this example, funding GFiber internally. It played out basically exactly as the scenario above - the incumbents rolled out gigabit cable/fiber at competitive prices in precisely those markets GFiber was threatening, preventing them from making serious inroads. There were a bunch of other factors (like regulatory issues and the difficulty of scaling last-mile telecom), but after recent examples like that investors would rather find virgin territory rather than fight price wars in large existing markets.
(IMHO, this is one thing wrong with American capitalism today, as our system relies on cutthroat competition and aggressive risk-taking behavior by investors to get good deals to consumers.)
Everyone agrees with that statement. The hard question is what "can't" means. Companies with a grow fast mentality always insist they could break even, and often present financial metrics indicating they do break even with the proper adjustments for purely growth-related costs. There's no obvious rule for how much you should trust a company's adjustments.
> 6 February 1833, New York (NY) Evening Post, pg. 2, col. 2:
> Among the business anomalies which meet the eye of a stranger visiting New-York, are the placards exhibited in the windows of the retail shops, informing passers by that the stock in trade within is selling off at prime cost, or according to the more alluring announcement which some have adopted, at fifty per cent. less than cost. A person attracted by this lure to become a purchaser, must soon come to the conclusion that either the veracity of the dealer is not of the most scrupulous description, or else that he laid in his goods at enormous prices. One in the habit of passing these shops, must at least smile to perceive that notwithstanding their owners have been selling off their goods “at less than cost” for so long a time, their shelves continue to be as well filled as ever. We have heard of one individual, who “wishing to retire in consequence of declining health,” was five years disposing of his merchandise, “at prime cost,” and at the end of this time he found his capital so much augmented that he removed into a more busy part of the city, and entered into trade on a much larger scale than before. How is it that trades-people can sell their goods at less than they paid for them, and yet realize a handsome profit, is one of those mysteries of commerce which we never could penetrate. Perhaps they are like the Irish mercer, who, having assured a lady customer that the silk he desired to dispose of to her actually cost him more per yard than he charged for it, was asked how he then could afford to sell it so low. “Ah, madam, he replied, we depend for our profit on selling a large quantity.”
It works out often enough that it’s worth investing in. The WeWork thing is a great example — if they could dominate commercial real estate, that would be nearly unlimited upside.
If you can't make your shit break-even or near-profitable at small scale, there is a big chance you will not be able to make it work at large scale.