I'd argue that what Unity needs is someone who's got a background in enterprise software, because selling to game developers is very different than selling games. No one with (successful) executive experience in enterprise software would have signed off on Unity's original revenue plan, simply because the number one rule in enterprise is "don't fuck with the customer's business model," which the "pay per download" model certainly did. Hiring a game industry CEO who pioneered predatory monetization models and was responsible for horrifying managerial practices within and between studios was a terrible choice for Unity, and his evident contempt for developers showed through often.
Whitehurst, on the other hand, has a history of strong execution across multiple industries, and built a reputation as someone who protected Red Hat's culture against attempts from within IBM to "Big Blueify" it (possibly to the detriment of his own role within IBM). Even as an interim, having him onboard is a good sign for how Unity is looking to repair its relationships with developers.
> Whitehurst, on the other hand, has a history of strong execution across multiple industries, and built a reputation as someone who protected Red Hat's culture against attempts from within IBM to "Big Blueify" it (possibly to the detriment of his own role within IBM). Even as an interim, having him onboard is a good sign for how Unity is looking to repair its relationships with developers.
100%
I was at IBM at the time. We really hoped he would eventually take over from Ginni once she left... nope. We really could have used someone who wasn't drinking the blue koolaid. Well.. the rest is history.
All this other crap about Silver Lake being a giant POS is concerning though.
Arvind Krishna seems like a pretty cool guy though, and definitely has engineering background.
It's interesting that everybody focuses on Red Hat after acquisition but no one ever asks how IBM is doing now. Maybe it's delusional to think that Red Hat could change something of its new overlord, but perhaps the acquisition was already showing the desire to change IBM from within?
IBM is doing okay, but not great. Their fiscal peak was a decade ago, and in terms of real dollars they aren't even at pre covid numbers yet. And on what little I know of the mainframe side, IBM is still very IBM-like, except they will now occasionally concur with consultants who point out places mainframe consumers are needlessly spending money.
It just felt like more of the same. I left soon after (2020) so perhaps things are changing. Was gutted to leave, IBM was always one of those mythical places to work for me, but in the end I made the right choice. Perhaps one day I'll go back, ha who knows!
“When you are six hours into playing Battlefield and you run out of ammo in your clip and we ask you for a dollar to reload, you’re really not that price sensitive at that point in time" - John Riccitiello
Amazing that he could so correctly identify why price-blinding tactics would work on people trying to have fun, but not do the inverse and see why it wouldn't work on people trying to develop a product.
You're right that selling a game engine is more an enterprise software business than game publisher, but Unity isn't trying to be a software company at this point, they're an ads and analytics service company, maybe doing a 'big tech' cosplay.
> simply because the number one rule in enterprise is "don't fuck with the customer's business model,"
On the other hand, the continued growth of gaming revenues, for both developers and services providers, compared to all other creative industries, is all attributable to innovations in business models. I suppose if people rocked the boat as little as you suggest, the only software being sold to game developers would be Denuvo.
You're making the exact mistake that OP warned against at the beginning: "selling to game developers is very different than selling games".
Even game studios can't just change things willy nilly. If Baldur's Gate 3 had been a microtransaction-funded F2P game, it would have been a flop—their target player base doesn't like that business model and wouldn't have gone for it. It's better to try out a new model with a brand new franchise than to try to pivot an existing franchise.
Enterprise software has these same constraints and more, because monkeying with the business model doesn't just mildly irritate prospective customers, it can and does throw off years of planning for thousands of people per company. They can't just shrug and decide to not invest in the next installment in your game franchise, they have to re-do their corporation's 5- and 10-year plans.
[M]onkeying with the business model doesn't just mildly irritate prospective customers, it can and does throw off years of planning for thousands of people per company.
This, very much so. Unity made two cardinal sins: creating a pricing model that didn't align with customers' business models (tying price to downloads rather than revenue), and then attempting to apply it retroactively to existing contracts (which, at best, would have resulted in high-profile and ugly legal battles against their largest customers and, likely, would have ended in a judge slapping their lawyers around with a copy of Williams v. Walker-Thomas).
In both cases, creating business model risk and uncertainty drove developers towards other software choices, not because developers are opposed to Unity asking for an engine license fee (after all, they already incorporate console fees, app store fees, etc. into their business models), but because Unity created financial uncertainty: they couldn't forecast those fees with decent probability and precision, and because they no longer trusted Unity not to try to retroactively screw them years down the road. Unity fixed the first problem, but now they've got to work to win back trust on the second.
>Unity made two cardinal sins: creating a pricing model that didn't align with customers' business models (tying price to downloads rather than revenue)
Everyone is assuming the majority of Unity's customers ("most" as measured by $$$, not by quantity of devs) aren't F2P games. I'm not sure that's actually the case; if most of their revenue comes from F2P then shafting everyone else in order to shore up their F2P business would likely be the correct business decision.
I'm not sure I follow. Aren't F2P games most misaligned with pricing per download since that means they end up with a bunch of negative value consumers and complete uncertainty whether they will end up with a positive or negative balance since they can't know much they will expend?
The traditional game developers can just go "Unity takes 1$ per download (or whatever), the average player downloads 3 times, the game costs 10$, 3$ goes to the storefront, so we have am average profit of 4$", which seems simple enough to deal with to me.
Thanks for introducing me to Williams v Walker-Thomas. In the ocean of Paywalled Law School Study Guide SEO, I can't find anywhere that tells the last chapter of the story. In light of Wright's decision, how did the lower court finally rule? After being given permission, did they actually follow through and throw out the contract?
Apologies for not seeing this earlier; faced with an unfavorable ruling (and, I believe, the UCC coming into force in DC around that time, which surely couldn't have helped their position), the store dropped its attempts to repossess the furniture in question, and settled the case with a damages payment to Williams.
>st change things willy nilly. If Baldur's Gate 3 had been a microtransaction-funded F2P game, it would have been a flop
Hot take, but I think it would have been fine financially. Would the online consumers and even media drag it through the mud? Definitely. But I reckon console gamers have less than a 10% chance in correctly predicting some f2p model would crash and burn.
Now I can't say if it'd be more profitable than selling as premium, because it didn't target mobile and that is the real market for that monetization. But I doubt it would have crashed.
It would've had to have been an extremely different game though. F2P P2W shovelware games are designed as such from the ground up. You can't just add micro-transactions to a normal (especially story driven) game and hope to make significant amounts of money.
Something tells me there is a fair bit of wiggleroom on the line between "no innovation whatsoever" and "making a large number of my customers situation untenable." I think innovation will continue just fine. Disrupting a business model is not the same as selling software to people under terms that are obviously and immediately harmful. Unless you are really clever and they are really dumb, I guess.
Whitehurst, on the other hand, has a history of strong execution across multiple industries, and built a reputation as someone who protected Red Hat's culture against attempts from within IBM to "Big Blueify" it (possibly to the detriment of his own role within IBM). Even as an interim, having him onboard is a good sign for how Unity is looking to repair its relationships with developers.