I mean, that was kind of my point. Now that they finally have a 'war' to fight, instead of a dispersed terrorist operation, suddenly it's less appealing, when this is basically a textbook example of a 'winnable' war.
There were no policy objectives in Afghanistan or Iraq, or they were very hard to achieve without decades of sustained presence. Meanwhile they're fairly clear for Ukraine, and arguably easier to achieve, if the Russian military is degraded enough that they pose no threat to Ukraine then the war is won.
Of course that leaves the pesky issue of those nuclear weapons, but I'd find that a much better argument than 'all our previous special military operations were a disaster'.
Yeah, personally, I mostly agree with your assessment as well.
The United States' view on strategy has always had a tension between the maritime power view and the continental power view.
For a maritime power (the US approach we've seen most of recently since WWII ), it's practically a no-brainer to invest heavily in the Ukraine conflict. It allows the US to degrade a rival's military abilities at low cost; it maintains the balance of power in Europe without direct US troop involvement; and it upholds the norms against territorial conquest that benefit maritime powers.
If the US is seeing a resurgence of isolationist/continental thinking, then you get different arguments: The conflict is distant from US territorial interests; border security and domestic concerns become more pressing; and regional conflicts elsewhere become mostly just distractions.
There were no policy objectives in Afghanistan or Iraq, or they were very hard to achieve without decades of sustained presence. Meanwhile they're fairly clear for Ukraine, and arguably easier to achieve, if the Russian military is degraded enough that they pose no threat to Ukraine then the war is won.
Of course that leaves the pesky issue of those nuclear weapons, but I'd find that a much better argument than 'all our previous special military operations were a disaster'.