> You want the police to regularily intercept and check your signal chats for fraud

No, that's not how lawful intercept laws work.

I want police to be able to obtain a judicial order to intercept, for a limited time, in cleartext, the (Signal chats, or whatever other encrypted communications) of identified parties reasonably suspected to be involved with criminal activity.

ChatControl is not that, and it's one of the reasons it's a nonstarter.

"I want police to be able to obtain a judicial order to intercept, for a limited time, in cleartext, the (Signal chats, or whatever other encrypted communications) of identified parties reasonably suspected to be involved with criminal activity."

They already have that in most (?) jurisdictions by now.

With a warrant, they can install a virus on the device that will then do targeted surveillance.

ChatControl is bad, because it is blanket surveillance of everyone without warrant.

> With a warrant, they can install a virus on the device that will then do targeted surveillance

Yeah, and that sponsors an entire malware industry!

I don't really know how I can make my position any clearer, but...

-Malware: bad!

-ChatControl (encryption backdoors): bad!

-Inability to do any kind of law enforcement involving "the Internet": double-plus bad!

-Enforcement of existing lawful interception laws in the face of new technology: maybe look at that?

"I don't really know how I can make my position any clearer, but..."

You could state in plain words what do you propose as an alternative.

I read what you wrote, but have no idea what you propose.

> I [...] have no idea what you propose

It's literally the last item in my list?

But to further clarify: I would like existing lawful interception laws to be extended to services like Signal.

Not in the sense that any EU country should be able to break Signal crypto (as ChatControl proposes, and which I think is an utterly ill-advised idea), but that competent law enforcement agencies should be able to demand unencrypted Signal communications from/to an identified EU party, for a limited time and purpose, upon a (reviewable) judicial order.

Most, if not all, EU countries currently have similar laws applying to telegrams, snail mail, email, telephony and whatnot. If you don't like those either, that's fine, but that's the status quo, and I would like to see that extended to services like Signal, as opposed to incompetently dumb measures like ChatControl...

Ok, so you want to break Encryption by law demand. Because this is what this means. Or how exactly would it work, technically? Signal does not know the private key of the 2 parties. Signal would have to inject a infected update into the client .. which is also malware. I rather have just those on target devices with a warrant, instead of breaking all encryption.

Or would you go extreme and outlaw decentraliced encrypted communication alltogether?

The law enforcement of which countries, under which sets of laws?

Should Thailand be granted access to enforce their lease majeste laws, for example? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A8se-majest%C3%A9_in_Th...

Who gets to decide what gets made available to who?

> law enforcement of which countries, under which sets of laws?

We're taking about ChatControl here, so law enforcement of EU countries, under their respective laws, into which EU law should have been incorporated

> Should Thailand be granted access to enforce their lease majeste laws

Same answer as "should Thailand be granted arrest rights to enforce <whatever>": they submit a legal assistance request to the country where the alleged crime occurred.

In the case of a lawful interception request for "lease[sic] majeste" reasons, I'm pretty sure this would be immediately rejected.

But, if not, the EU subject of such interception would have lots and lots of avenues to get redress.

Again, and I'm getting sort of tired from repeating myself: "lawful interception" does not mean "indiscriminate surveillance at the whim of whomever" -- it is a well-defined concept that has been used to determine which telegrams and mail pieces to open and which telephone calls to record for ages now. Your country absolutely does it, as we speak, no matter where you live. It's just that modern technology has far outpaced the scope of this legislation, and things like ChatControl are (incompetent) responses to that.

ChatControl is not a good idea, and has very little chance of becoming reality. But to stop dumb proposals like this from coming up over and over again, something has got to give.

And when some other countries pass laws demanding access to the same mechanism that the EU gets?

I’ll go a step further: if EU sovereigns claim the right to “lawfully intercept” their citizens' private communications, why shouldn’t every state enjoy the same privilege? Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Uganda will be exemplary custodians of such technology. You have nothing to fear, citizen: their democratic constitutions and impeccable legal codes will protect you.

Your comment is incoherent and displays a total misunderstanding of the technology. There is no way to make lawful intercept work with end-to-end encryption: it is mathematically impossible. And don't waste our time with stupid suggestions about key escrow or the like. We know that those keys will inevitably be leaked or misused for political purposes.

Fail to see that it would even work. If the scam has happened how would lawful interception afterwards help? The criminal can just use burner accounts and the chat log exist on the scammed persons device.