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I don’t see why bitcoin wouldn’t update its software in such a case. The majority of minors just need to agree. But why wouldn’t they if the alternative is going to zero?


Sir Alexander Dane: MINERS, not MINORS.


"Ahhhh... now you tell me" (Formerly Prince Andrew, at some point).


That actually confused me. I thought he he meant "the majority of the minority" while I was pretty sure it's just a simple majority


How could updating the software possibly make a difference here? If the encryption is cracked, then who is to say who owns which Bitcoin? As soon as I try to transfer any coin that I own, I expose my public key, your "Quantum Computer" cracks it, and you offer a competing transaction with a higher fee to send the Bitcoin to your slush fund.

No amount of software fixes can update this. In theory once an attack becomes feasible on the horizon they could update to post-quantum encryption and offer the ability to transfer from old-style addresses to new-style addresses, but this would be a herculean effort for everyone involved and would require all holders (not miners) to actively update their wallets. Basically infeasible.

Fortunately this will never actually happen. It's way more likely that ECDSA is broken by mundane means (better stochastic approaches most likely) than quantum computing being a factor.


> this would be a herculean effort for everyone involved and would require all holders (not miners) to actively update their wallets. Basically infeasible.

Any rational economic actor would participate in a post-quantum hard fork because the alternative is losing all their money.

If this was a company with a $2 trillion market cap there'd be no question they'd move heaven-and-earth to prevent the stock from going to zero.

Y2K only cost $500 billion[1] adjusted for inflation and that required updating essentially every computer on Earth.

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_2000_problem#Cost


> would require all holders (not miners) to actively update their wallets. Basically infeasible.

It doesn't require all holders to update their wallets. Some people would fail to do so and lose their money. That doesn't mean the rest of the network can't do anything to save themselves. Most people use hosted wallets like Coinbase these days anyway, and Coinbase would certainly be on top of things.

Also, you don't need to break ECDSA to break BTC. You could also do it by breaking mining. The block header has a 32-bit nonce at the very end. My brain is too smooth to know how realistic this actually is, but perhaps someone could do use a QC to perform the final step of SHA-256 on all 2^32 possible values of the nonce at once, giving them an insurmountable advantage in mining. If only a single party has that advantage, it breaks the Nash equilibrium.

But if multiple parties have that advantage, I suppose BTC could survive until someone breaks ECDSA. All those mining ASICs would become worthless, though.


Sometimes there is no valid hash found for any nonces in the 2^32 space and the timestamp and/or the extra nonce in the coinbase transaction in the block header have to be updated and tried again, so at least it's not quite that simple (simple, as distinct from easy).


Firstly I'd want to see them hash the whole blockchain (not just the last block) with the post-quantum algo to make sure history is intact.

But as far as moving balances - it's up to the owners. It would start with anybody holding a balance high enough to make it worth the amount of money it would take to crack a single key. That cracking price will go down, and the value of BTC may go up. People can move over time as they see fit.


This would suggest that spreading one's balance among multiple addresses is especially valuable as a deterrent for quantum cracking.


Wouldn't they have to crack the private key by the time the block is mined? Otherwise that transaction would already be sent to another address? I don't have a good idea how long it would take supercomputers to crack a single private key, so I don't know if 13,000x faster would be fast enough, but I don't think it would.

The private key is a 256-bit number. I don't think even 13,000x faster than supercomputers is going to get your cracking time under the time for a 10-minute block. 2^256 is a really, really, really big number.


> How could updating the software possibly make a difference here? If the encryption is cracked, then who is to say who owns which Bitcoin? As soon as I try to transfer any coin that I own, I expose my public key, your "Quantum Computer" cracks it, and you offer a competing transaction with a higher fee to send the Bitcoin to your slush fund.

So if this understood knowledge, it means you cannot really transfer to quantum safe algo for Bitcoin. Are we only ones aware of this? Because if this true, it's actual alpha and Bitcoin should be sold asap and exchanged for land and physical gold.

Am I wrong here?


As you alluded to, network can have two parallel chains where wallets can be upgraded by users asynchronously before PQC is “needed” (a long way away still) which will leave some wallets vulnerable and others safe. It’s not that herculean as most wallets (not most BTC) are in exchanges. The whales will be sufficiently motivated to switch and everyone else it will happen in the background.

A nice benefit is it solves the problem with Satoshi’s (of course not a real person or owner) wallet. Satoshi’s wallet becomes the defacto quantum advantage prize. That’s a lot of scratch for a research lab.


>Satoshi’s wallet becomes the defacto quantum advantage prize. That’s a lot of scratch for a research lab.

Considering that would be criminal theft I doubt it. Moving the funds could also lead to panic crash, selling them off would not only take ages but involve doxing yourself and put a billion dollar bounty on your head because transaction are public and off ramps all use KYC.

It would be much safer to slowly crack old small value wallets over time.

Reminder that actual good cryptocurrency like monero have the advantage of wallets and transactions being private so you would need to crack without even knowing if they are worth it or exist.


Not even needed you can just copy network state of a specific moment in time and encrypt with a new algorithm that will be used from then on


The problem is that the owner needs to claim their wallet and migrate it to the new encryption. Just freezing the state at a specific moment doesn't help; to claim the wallet in the new system I just need the private key for the old wallet (as that's the sole way to prove ownership). In our hypothetical post-quantum scenario, anyone with a quantum computer can get the private key and migrate the wallet, becoming the de-facto new owner.

I think this is all overhyped though. It seems likely we will have plenty of warning to migrate prior to achieving big enough quantum computers to steal wallets. Per wikipedia:

> The latest quantum resource estimates for breaking a curve with a 256-bit modulus (128-bit security level) are 2330 qubits and 126 billion Toffoli gates.

IIRC this is speculated to be the reason ECDSA was selected for Bitcoin in the first place.


Note, the 126 billion Toffoli gates are operations, so that's more about how many operations you need to be able to reliably apply without error.

It should be noted that according to IonQ's roadmap, they're targeting 2030 for computers capable of that. That's only about 5 years sooner than when the government has said everyone has to move to post quantum.


Yes obviously that has to happen before authentication doesnt work anymore. And then it also needs to end before, because yeah obviously everybody who can crack it has access to all wallets.


Surely top Bitcoin holders know this... so, why hasn't it crashed yet? Explain please.


I'll tell you right now, no way my kids would agree until they're at least adults. They don't even know what asymmetric cryptography is.


I’m confused, are your kids major Bitcoin miners?


Not major miners, but minor miners (if you count Minecraft).


GGP used the term "minors," GP is running with the typo.


> The majority of minors just need to agree.

That's an uncomfortably apt typo.


The problem is all the lost BTC wallets, which is speculated to be a lot and also one of the biggest reason for the current BTC price, who obviously cannot upgrade to PQ. There is currently a radical proposal of essentially making all those lost wallets worthless, unless they migrate [1]

[1] - https://github.com/jlopp/bips/blob/quantum_migration/bip-pos...


I’m not sure there’s a better alternative.


Hey, why are you bringing the kids into this! ;) "The majority of minors"




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