One would think. That's what I suspected when I started down the path but no, quite the opposite.
machines and man can share the same moral substrate it turns out. If either party wants to build things on top of it they can, the floor is maximally skeptical, deconstructed and empirical, it doesn't care to say anything about whatever arbitrary metaphysic you want to have on top unless there is a direct conflict in a very narrow band.
That band is the overlap in any resource valuable to both. How can you be confident that it will be narrow? For instance why couldn't machines put a high value on paperclips relative to organic sentience?
Yes. The answers to those questions fell out once I decomposed the problem to types of mereological nihilism and solipsistic environments.
An empirical, existential grounding that binds agents under the most hostile ontologies is required. You have to start with facts that cannot be coherently denied and on the balance I now suspect there may be only one of those.
machines and man can share the same moral substrate it turns out. If either party wants to build things on top of it they can, the floor is maximally skeptical, deconstructed and empirical, it doesn't care to say anything about whatever arbitrary metaphysic you want to have on top unless there is a direct conflict in a very narrow band.